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CERTAIN IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT LAND
NOT SUBJECT TO ACREAGE LIMITATION
OF FEDERAL RECLAMATION LAWS
WATER LAW-FEDERAL RECLAMATION PROJECTS: The
United States Supreme Court holds that the 160-acre limitation for
receipt of reclamation project waters does not apply to certain pri-
vate lands in Imperial Valley, California. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S.
352 (1980), rehearing denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980).
INTRODUCTION
The federal reclamation program is responsible for the "greening"
of the West. Such a large scale endeavor would inevitably encounter
problems. Current problems arising from reclamation projects con-
cern the development of private lands and the application of owner
eligibility restrictions.1 One such restriction was addressed by the
United States Supreme Court in Bryant v. Yellen.2 The fundamental
issue in that case was whether the federal reclamation laws, which
limit irrigation water deliveries from reclamation projects to 160
acres under single ownership, apply to Boulder Canyon Project
waters being delivered to the Imperial Irrigation District.
BACKGROUND
In Bryant v. Yellen, a group of residents in the Imperial Valley
(hereinafter Yellen group) brought suit to force compliance with cer-
tain provisions of the reclamation laws in the Imperial Irrigation Dis-
trict. Resolution of the controversy required legal review and analy-
sis of the reclamation laws by the United States Supreme Court.
National Reclamation Act of 1902
Since the founding of the United States, Congress has encouraged
the settlement and development of the public domain. The National
Reclamation Act of 19023 (hereinafter the Act), as supplemented
and amended, is the current means to implement this policy. The Act
1. Renda, Owner Eligibility Restrictions-Acreage and Residency, 8 Nat. Res. L. 265,
270 (1975).
2. 447 U.S. 352 (1980), rehearing denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980).
3. Act of June 17, 1902 ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43
u.s.c.).
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provides a mechanism whereby previously arid land can be made cul-
tivable by the construction of irrigation works financed through a
federal loan program. The Act's primary goal is to promote the family
farm and to safeguard against speculative and monopolistic owner-
ship of land and water privileges.4 The United States Supreme Court
has described this fundamental congressional policy as:
one requiring that the benefits therefrom be made available to the
largest number of people, consistent, of course, with the public
good. This policy has been accomplished by limiting the quantity of
land in a single ownership to which project water might be supplied.
It has been applied to public land opened up for entry under the rec-
lamation law as well as privately owned lands, which might receive
project water.'
The land limitation proscription, which the Yellen group sought to
enforce, was designed to assure the achievement of the Act's goal. 6
The current basis for the administration of this acreage limitation is
found in section 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926.1 Sec-
tion 46 governs the making of water delivery contracts between the
Secretary of Interior and irrigation districts. These contracts are to
require that any lands held in excess of 160 acres will be appraised
by the Secretary of Interior.8 Water will not be delivered to excess
lands if the owner refuses to execute a recordable contract for the
sale of his lands at terms and conditions specified by the Secretary.
The Yellen group claimed that, if these contractual requirements
were complied with in the Imperial Valley, there would be excess
land available for its members to purchase at affordable prices below
the market value for irrigated land. This assertion gave the Yellen
group standing to press the case on its own behalf.9
4. Taylor, The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy, 64 Yale L.J. 477, 484-
486 (1954).
5. Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 292 (1958).
6. The land limitation provision is found in section 5 of the Act: No right to the use of
water for land in private ownership shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty
acres to any one landowner... and no such right shall permanently attach until all pay.
ments therefor are made. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). The section also contains a residency re-
striction which is omitted because it is beyond the scope of this Note and was not con-
sidered by the Court in Bryant v. Yellen.
7. 43 U.S.C. § 423(e) (1976).
8. Id. The Secretary, when appraising excess land, must exclude the value added to the
land by virtue of the irrigation project. The acreage limitation is an anti-monopoly provision
and the appraisal requirement is an anti-speculation device to control prices. The Yellen
Group desired to purchase the excess lands which might become available at prices below
the market value for irrigated land if section 46 of the Act were held applicable in the Im-
perial Valley.
9. The Yellen group had originally sought to intervene in the Department of the Inter-
ior's suit for declaratory judgment against the Imperial Irrigation District, but its application
[Vol. 21926
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The excess land provisions form an important cornerstone in the
preservation of the public policy behind reclamation law.' 0 Through-
out the history of federal reclamation, however, administrative non-
enforcement of these provisions has allegedly frustrated congres-
sional intent by allowing water delivery to excess land.'' Despite
many attempts to eliminate these provisions, Congress has consis-
tently reaffirmed the general policy of applying the 160-acre limita-
tion to federal reclamation projects.' 2
The Boulder Canyon Project Act and the Imperial Valley
The antecedent to the conflict in Bryant v. Yellen was the contract
between the United States and the Imperial Irrigation District under
the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1929' ' (hereinafter Project Act).
The underlying purpose of the contract was to reclaim the Imperial
Valley. The Imperial Valley is located south of the Salton Sea in
southeastern California and in its natural state is an arid desert. In
1901, irrigation began in the valley by diverting water from the Colo-
rado River. In 1922, California joined six other states' ' in the Colo-
rado River Basin in an agreement known as the Colorado River Com-
pact (hereinafter Compact).' ' This Compact provided for allocation
of waters among the Upper and Lower Basin states and among the
states in each Basin, flood control, regulation of water supplies on a
predictable and useful basis, and construction of a canal to the Im-
perial Valley that did not pass through Mexico.' 6 The Compact also
provided that present perfected rights to the beneficial use of waters
of the Colorado River be unimpaired by the Compact.' " In Bryant v.
Yellen, the landowners (hereinafter Bryant group) relied heavily on
this provision of the Compact when they argued that the acreage lim-
was denied. The government lost in the United States District Court and decided not to ap-
peal. United States v. Imperial Irrigation District, 322 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1971). The
Yellen group again sought leave to intervene and prosecute the appeal in the government's
suit against the District The Court of Appeals allowed intervention. The court found that
the injury alleged by the Yelen group was a direct result of the non-enforcement of section
46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926. United States v. Imperial Irrigation District,
559 F.2d 509, 522-524 (1977). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals on standing Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366 (1980).
10. 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 120 at 209 (1967).
11. Taylor, Water, Land and Environment Imperial Valley: Law Caught in the Winds of
Politics, 13 NAT. RES. J. 1, 32(1973).
12. Renda, Owner Eligibility Restrictions-Acreage and Residency, 8 Nat. Res. L. 265,
279 (1975).
13. 43 U.S.C. § § 617-617v (1976).
14. Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming.
15. The Compact can be found at 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
16. 447 U.S. 352, 357 (1980).
17. Id.
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itation did not apply to lands already under irrigation at the effective
date of the Project Act.
The Project Act ratified and implemented the Compact. Through
reclamation program funding, the Project Act provided for the con-
struction of the Boulder Dam (now Hoover Dam) and the Imperial
Dam, from which water would be diverted to a canal running to the
Imperial Valley. On the date the Project Act became effective, the
Imperial Irrigation District was diverting and delivering water to
424,145 acres of privately owned farmland.
The Project Act includes terms and conditions that govern the
relationship between the federal government and irrigation districts.
Several sections are critical to an understanding of the controversy
which arose in Bryant v. Yellen.
Section 4(b) of the Project Act requires the Secretary of Interior
to make provision for revenues with the irrigation districts "by con-
tract or otherwise" to ensure payment of all "expenses of construc-
tion, operation, and maintenance of said main canal and appurtenant
structures in the manner provided in the reclamation law." ' 8 Section
6 mandates that the works authorized are to be used: "First, for river
regulation, improvement of navigation, and flood control; second,
for irrigation and domestic uses and satisfaction of present perfected
rights in pursuance of Article VIII of said Colorado River Compact;
and third, for power."' 9
Section 9 of the Project Act authorizes the opening of public lands
that could become irrigable by the project in accordance with the
160-acre limitation of the reclamation law.2 0 Section 14 states that
the Project Act is supplemental to the Act itself, "which said recla-
mation law shall govern the construction, operation, and manage-
ment of the works herein authorized, except as otherwise herein pro-
vided." 2 1
The Yellen group contended that section 14 read in conjunction
with section 4(b) of the Project Act explicitly called for the reclama-
tion laws to govern contracts between irrigation districts and the
United States. The Bryant group asserted that the qualifying clause
of section 14, "except as otherwise herein provided," subordinated
section 14 to other specific provisions in the Project Act, most im-
portantly section 6. The Bryant group claimed that section 6 con-
flicted with the application of the excess land provisions of section
46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, thereby rendering the
18. 43 U.S.C. § 617c(b) (1976).
19. Id. at § 617e.
20. Id. at § 617h.
21. Id. at § 617m.
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latter provisions inapplicable to the Imperial Irrigation District. That
group also contended that if Congress had intended for the acreage
limitation to apply to private lands in the Imperial Valley, Congress
would have done so explicitly, as it did for public lands under section
9.
The United States entered into a contract with the Imperial Irriga-
tion District in 1932 pursuant to section 4(b) of the Project Act; this
contract included no acreage limitation provision for private lands.
As required by law,2 2 the court issued a final judgment on the con-
tract between the District and the United States on July 1, 1933.23
That judgment confirmed the authorization and the validity of the
contract in all respects. In the proceedings leading up to the judg-
ment, Secretary of Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur submitted a letter
(hereinafter Wilbur Letter) on February 24, 1933 to the District ad-
dressing the question of whether the 160-acre limitation of section 5
of the Act was applicable to the Imperial Valley. Among other things,
the letter stated:
Upon careful consideration the view was reached that this limitation
does not apply to lands now cultivated and having a present water
right. These lands, having already a water right, are entitled to have
such vested right recognized without regard to the acreage limitation
mentioned. Congress evidently recognized that these lands had a
vested right when the provision was inserted that no charge shall be
made for the storage, use or delivery of water to be furnished these
areas.
2 4
One week later, the Assistant Commissioner and Chief Counsel of the
Bureau of Reclamation wrote a letter stating that the Department of
Interior's interpretation applied not only to section 5 of the Act but
also to section 46 of the 1926 Act.
2 1
The Wilbur letter expressed the view of the Department of Interior
until 1964 when, in respnse to congressional inquiries in 1961 and
1964 concerning non-enforcement of the limitation, the Department
adopted the view of its Solicitor. The Solicitor determined that the
limitation on water deliveries to excess land should have been applied
to Imperial Valley lands in private ownership pursuant to section 14
of the Project Act.2 6 Attempts by the Department to enforce com-
pliance with the excess land provision were the genesis of the contro-
22. A final judgment is required under California law.
23. Hewes v. All Persons, No. 15460, Superior Court, Imperial County (App. to Pet. in
No. 79-435, 120a-154a (1933)).
24. App. 177a, 71 Interior Dec. 530 (1964).
25. App. 179a, 71 Interior Dec. 531 (1964).
26. Taylor, supra note 10, at 11-13.
October 1981] 929
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versy in Bryant v. Yellen. When the Imperial Irrigation District refused
to renegotiate its contract to incorporate the excess land provision,
the United States brought an action for declaratory relief.2
BRYANT v. YELLEN
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the 160-
acre limitation did not apply to certain private lands in the Imperial
Valley. The Court reasoned that section 6 of the Project Act, requir-
ing satisfaction of present perfected rights, supersedes section 46 of
the 1926 Act, which limits the maximum amount of acreage in single
ownership that can receive project waters. Present perfected rights
are those water rights acquired in accordance with state law, exer-
cised by the actual diversion of a specific quantity of water, and ap-
plied to a defined area of land.2 8 The Court determined that, prior
to the effective date of the Project Act, the District had a privilege
and a duty under state law to service farms regardless of their acre-
age. 2 9 Therefore, this characteristic of California water law placed
an unavoidable limitation on the Secretary's power to enforce the
excess land provision in the District.3
To support its construction of the Project Act, the Court con-
sidered legislative history. The opinion accorded some weight to the
fact that the 160-acre limitation was deleted from the bill finally en-
acted into law.3 The Court also relied on the "contemporaneous
construction" of the Project Act given in the Wilbur Letter and the
subsequent acceptance of this view during the incumbencies of six
successive Secretaries.3 2
In addition to the irrigation of 424,145 acres of privately owned
farmland at the inception of the Project Act, an additional 14,000
acres were being irrigated at the time of Bryant v. Yellen. The Court
remanded the case for further proceedings, if necessary, to determine
the question of whether the acreage limitation applied to the 14,000
acres. 
3 3
ANALYSIS
In Bryant v. Yellen, the United States Supreme Court extended
the present perfected rights requirement of section 6 of the Project
27. United States v. Imperial Irrigation District, 322 F. Supp. 11 (1971).
28. 447 U.S. 352, 369 (1980).
29. Id. at 372.
30. Id. at 370.
31. Id. at 374.
32. Id. at 377.
33. Id. at 379.
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Act to individual landowners within an irrigation district. The Court
had addressed the application of this requirement only once before.
In that case, Arizona v. California, a 4 the basic controversy involved
interstate allocation of Colorado River water. The Court looked to
the meaning and scope of the Project Act and, of significance in
Bryant v. Yellen, recognized that section 6, which requires satisfac-
tion of "present perfected rights," placed a significant limitation on
the Secretary of Interior's power.'3 In a Per Curiam and Supplemen-
tal Decree 3 6 which implemented the Court's decision in Arizona v.
California, the Imperial Irrigation District, and not individual land-
owners within the District, was named the claimant of the present
perfected rights.' ' By broadening the scope of present perfected
rights to include individual landowners within an irrigation district,
the Court in Bryant v. Yellen has further confined the Secretary's
power to allocate Colorado River waters consistent with reclamation
law.
In extending this perfected right to individual landowners, the
Court emphasized that it is a water right originating under state law.
State water law must be consulted in determining the content and
characteristics of the water right adjudicated to the district. 8I The
state right is to be defined without regard to the existence of any
duty imposed by federal law. 9 The Court determined that, under
state law, the Imperial Irrigation District is a trustee of the water
rights for the benefit of the landowners and, as such, the benefi-
ciaries had a perfected right to utilize water without regard to the
size of the land holding prior to the enactment of the Project Act.4 0
This construction of "present perfected rights" undermines the
purposes of the Act and sets aside a major eligibility criteria for re-
ceipt of federal funding under the Act.4 1 The Court could have
avoided this result and brought federal and state law into harmony
by adopting the analysis of the court of appeals on the issue. In its
opinion, the court of appeals determined that the irrigation district,
not individual landowners, held legal title to water rights under Cali-
fornia law. Those rights are held in trust for the common benefit of
all landowners, and not for any individual landowner. 2 Because in-
34. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
35. 373 U.S. at 584.
36. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
37. Id. at 429.
38. 447 U.S. 352, 371 (1980).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 372-73.
41. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
42. United States v. Imperial Irrigation District, 559 F.2d 509, 529 (1977).
October 19811 931
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dividual landowners have no vested rights to a specific quantity of
water, present perfected rights are satisfied by delivering out to the
Imperial Irrigation District all the water to which it is entitled. Excess
land could be deprived of water without impeding the total amount
of water delivered to the District.
The United States Supreme Court case of Ivanhoe Irrigation Dis-
trict v. McCracken4  supports the court of appeals' decision denying
exclusion of the 160-acre limitation. In Ivanhoe, the Court recog-
nized that where a reclamation project has been exempted from the
acreage limitation because of its peculiar circumstances, it has been
done by express congressional enactment.44 The Court in Bryant v.
Yellen nevertheless distinguished Ivanhoe because that case did not
involve the satisfaction of present perfected rights.4 Further, the
Bryant v. Yellen Court noted that "satisfaction of perfected rights"
was an effective expression of congressional exemption.4 6 The
reasons for this retreat from a strict construction of the reclamation
laws as enunciated in Ivanhoe are not readily apparent from the
Court's legal analysis.
The Court's attempt to bolster its conclusions by a review of the
Project Act's legislative history is less than compelling. The Court
itself acknowledged the weakness of this type of evidence. 4" In its
view, however, nothing suggested that Congress intended to include
the acreage limitation. Because present perfected rights had been
recognized in the Project Act, the Court found it a fair inference that
Congress intended an exemption for private landowners.4 8
Perhaps the most persuasive factor in the case in support of the
Court's construction of the Project Act was the contemporaneous
view as expressed in the Wilbur Letter and the subsequent reliance
on this letter by the landowners in the District. The Court noted
that the letter was not officially repudiated by any Secretary of In-
terior until 1964.' 9 In essence, the Court seems to be adopting an
equitable estoppel notion in construing the Project Act. Its reliance
on the Wilbur Letter may have been misplaced. First, the Wilbur
Letter was not an official ruling or order and, therefore, any reliance
by the parties would be unjustified. Second, there were contrary
views and concerns expressed which indicate that the inapplicability
43. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
44. Id. at 292.
45. 447 U.S. at 372.
46. Id. at 373 n.24.
47. Id. at 375.
48. Id. at 374-78.
49. Id. at 377.
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of the acreage limitation was not a settled issue.' 0 Third, administra-
tive agency interpretation of statutes has no binding effect on the
courts. 5' The real danger in the weight given to the Wilbur Letter
and to the administrative non-enforcement of the acreage limitation
is the precedent it sets in defining congressional intent. It rewards
administrative acts of omission at the expense of legislative enact-
ments.
In summary, the Court's decision in Bryant v. Yellen seems to be
based more on equity than on law or precedent. Whether the same
result is to be contemplated absent the administrative history of this
case is doubtful.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Bryant v. Yellen has finally settled the ex-
cess land issue for land in the Imperial Valley under irrigation at the
effective date of the Project Act. In so doing, the Court gave little
weight to the purposes and vital policies behind the reclamation laws.
Instead, the Court took the most expedient route. It avoided the re-
distribution of vast acres of irrigable land in one of the richest agri-
cultural regions in the Country. The unique facts present in Bryant v.
Yellen should limit the impact on the Secretary of Interior's power
to enforce the excess land provision elsewhere.
JANE C. COHEN
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